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ABSTRACT 
Manifest disregard is a common law reason for not enforcing an arbitration award. 
This principle applies when the arbitrator knew and understood the law, but the 
arbitrator disregarded the applicable law. Presently, the United States Supreme Court 
has not made a definite decision on whether manifest disregard is still a valid reason 
for vacating the award (known as “vacatur”), and the Court is highly deferential to 
arbitrator decisions. Consequently, the lower courts are split on the issue. For 
international commercial arbitration awards, manifest disregard can only apply to a 
foreign award that is decided under United States law or in the United States. 
This Note will argue that manifest disregard should still apply to arbitration awards. 
However, arbitration contract clauses would be improved with the addition of 
language for appeals based upon manifest disregard to an arbitration appeals 
tribunal. The customary goal of arbitration is to provide a confidential, cost effective 
and expedited resolution of contract disputes. Therefore, an arbitration contract 
clause requiring that an appeals tribunal decide all manifest disregard questions 
would further these traditional arbitration goals. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
aybe” is a frustrating word when one is looking for a 
definitive answer.1 Unfortunately, that was the Supreme 
Court’s answer on whether an arbitral award is enforceable after an 
arbitrator knowingly ignored the applicable law to a contract, 
otherwise known as manifest disregard.2 “Maybe” is even more 
troubling when hundreds of millions of dollars are at stake during an 
international commercial arbitration. In the United States, a losing 
party arguing manifest disregard may be able to appeal an arbitral 
award. However, lower courts across the country lack guidance on 
whether manifest disregard is grounds for the nonenforcement of an 
award.3 Therefore, this uncertainty weakens the confidence in arbitral 
awards for the contracting parties.4 
The ambiguity also has detrimental effects for common place 
transactions.5 In Citigroup Global Markets v. Bacon, the arbitrators 
ordered the defendant, Citigroup Global Markets, to pay the plaintiff, 
Mrs. Bacon, $256,000 after her husband made unauthorized debits 
from her retirement account.6 In response, Citigroup Global argued the 
arbitrators’ decision knowingly ignored the applicable law, and the 
district court ruled in favor of Citigroup Global.7 On appeal, the Fifth 
Circuit ruled that manifest disregard is not permitted; however, 
                                                            
1 See Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 585 (2008) 
(emphasizing the Court’s uncertainty by using the word “maybe” when 
reviewing multiple interpretations of manifest disregard); see also Perry S. 
Granof & Randy J. Aliment, Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) in 
International Business Transactions, 2012.2 JURISTE INT’L 58, 59 (2012), 
http://www.granofinternational.com/wp-
content/uploads/2016/02/Granof_Aliment_Juriste_International.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/43EV-R2N3] (noting that the common law grounds for 
manifest disregard could “conflict with the laws in statutory law based 
countries”). 
2 See generally Hall Street, 552 U.S. at 584. 
3 See MyLinda K. Sims & Richard A. Bales, Much Ado About Nothing: The 
Future of Manifest Disregard After Hall Street, 62 S.C. L. REV. 407, 418-21 
(2010) (discussing Hall Street’s confusion with manifest disregard dicta and 
resulting circuit split). 
4 See generally id. 
5 See generally Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349, 359 (5th Cir. 
2009). 
6 See id. at 350. 
7 See id. 
“M
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Citigroup could still argue to vacate the arbitral award under other 
statutory grounds.8 For Mrs. Bacon, she lost her retirement funds, and 
arbitration failed to be an expedient method to resolve this dispute 
with her retirement investment bank.9 Instead, Mrs. Bacon’s arbitral 
award was in limbo as the award went through the lengthy procedural 
appeals process.10 
Specifically, manifest disregard is a common law reason for not 
enforcing an arbitration award.11 This principle applies when the 
arbitrator knew and understood the law, but the arbitrator disregarded 
the applicable law.12 Presently, the U.S. Supreme Court has not made a 
definite decision on whether manifest disregard is still a valid reason 
for vacating the award (known as “vacatur”), and the Court is highly 
deferential to arbitrator decisions.13 Consequently, the lower courts are 
split on this issue.14 For international commercial arbitration awards, 
manifest disregard can only apply to a foreign award that is decided 
under United States law or in the United States.15 This Note will argue 
that manifest disregard should still apply to arbitration awards. 
Further, arbitration contract clauses would be improved with the 
addition of language for appeals stating that manifest disregard is to be 
decided only by an appeals arbitrator rather than a court.16 The 
customary goal of arbitration is to provide a confidential, cost effective 
and expedited resolution of contract disputes.17 Therefore, an 
arbitration contract clause requiring that an appeals tribunal decide all 
                                                            
8 See id. at 358. 
9 See generally id. 
10 See id. 
11 Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 672 n.3 (2010). 
12 See id. 
13 See generally Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 
(2008). 
14 Sims & Bales, supra note 3, 420-21. 
15 See Mendelka v. Penson Fin. Servs., No. 16-cv-7393 (PKC), 2017 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 49536, *8-10 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2017) (recognizing manifest disregard 
of the law in the Second Circuit and finding that the award was not in manifest 
disregard of the law). 
16 See JAMS Optional Arbitration Appeal Procedure, JAMS, 
https://www.jamsadr.com/appeal (last visited Mar. 18, 2018) 
[https://perma.cc/6ASG-RTC3] (recommending contract language for arbitration 
appeals tribunal). 
17 See Granof & Aliment, supra note 1, at 58. 
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manifest disregard questions would protect these traditional arbitration 
goals.18 
Part II of this Note will explore the origins of international 
commercial arbitration starting with the 1958 United Nations 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards (“Convention”), and the exceptions to enforcement of an 
arbitral award. Part III will examine manifest disregard in detail by its 
definition and case history on its application. Part IV will discuss the 
circuit split on the issue of manifest disregard. Part V will suggest a 
possible resolution of the issue in a future U.S. Supreme Court case. 
Next, Part VI will argue that manifest disregard must be a valid ground 
for the non-enforcement of an arbitration award under United States 
law and that an arbitration appeals tribunal should decide manifest 
disregard issues. Finally, Part VII will recommend specific contract 
language that could be added to arbitration provisions. 
II.  ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 
A. 1958 New York Convention 
The Convention allowed the federal courts to enforce arbitration 
awards between contracting parties regardless of previous 
jurisdictional restrictions created by the parties’ citizenship.19 For the 
Convention to apply to an international commercial arbitration 
contract, the four following elements must be met: (1) a written 
agreement between the parties to arbitrate the dispute; (2) the location 
of the arbitration is in a country that is a signatory to this New York 
Convention; (3) the dispute arises out of a commercial legal 
relationship; and (4) at least one party to the arbitration agreement is 
not an American citizen.20 Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court 
recommends that international contract disagreements be arbitrated.21 
Thus, this Convention’s objective was to recognize and enforce 
international business arbitration agreements and resulting arbitral 
awards by creating shared standards for the participating countries.22 
                                                            
18 Id.; see also infra Parts VI & VII. 
19 9 U.S.C. §§ 201–208 (2011); Energy Transport, Ltd. v. M.V. San Sebastian, 348 
F. Supp. 2d 186, 197-98 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
20 Khan v. Parsons Glob. Servs., 480 F.Supp.2d 327, 339 (D.D.C. 2007). 
21 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 638 
(1985). 
22 Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519-20 (1974). 
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The resulting United States statutes, along with the Convention, 
reinforced a “strong presumption in favor” of multinational business 
disagreements being arbitrated.23 The overarching purpose of 
international commercial arbitration is to enforce arbitration awards.24 
If an arbitration agreement is disputed, public policy is difficult to 
prove for vacatur.25 However, if a losing party insists on vacating the 
award, then a court will only review the award for the most egregious 
situations.26 
B. Exceptions to Enforcement of Arbitral Awards 
The Convention identifies seven grounds for vacating an arbitral 
award in Article V.27 The grounds are: 
(a) The parties to the agreement referred to in [A]rticle 
II were, under the law applicable to them, under some 
incapacity, or the said agreement is not valid under the 
law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing 
any indication thereon, under the law of the country 
where the award was made; or (b) The party against 
whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice 
of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the 
arbitration proceedings or was otherwise unable to 
present his case; or (c) The award deals with a 
difference not contemplated by or not falling within the 
terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains 
decisions on matters beyond the scope of the 
submission to arbitration, provided that, if the decisions 
on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated 
from those not so submitted, that part of the award 
                                                            
23 See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 638. 
24 See Eazy Electronics & Tech., L.L.C. v. L.G. Electronics, Inc., 226 F. Supp. 3d 
68, 73 (D.P.R. 2016); see Haining Zhang v. Schlatter, No. 1-Civ.-1793(ALC) 
(GWG), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138968, at *28 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2013) 
(holding that the court gives great deference to arbitration); accord Aioi Nissay 
Dowa Ins. Co. v. Prosight Specialty Mgmt. Co., No. 12-Civ. 3274-(LPO), 2012 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118233, at *8-9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2012). 
25 See Lipcon v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s, 148 F.3d 1285, 1298-99 (11th Cir. 
1998). 
26 See id. 
27 See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards art. V, 21 U.S.T. 2519, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 (June 10, 1958) [hereinafter 
New York Convention]. 
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which contains decisions on matters submitted to 
arbitration may be recognized and enforced; or (d) The 
composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral 
procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of 
the parties, or, failing such agreement, was not in 
accordance with the law of the country where the 
arbitration took place; or (e) The award has not yet 
become binding on the parties, or has been set aside or 
suspended by a competent authority of the country in 
which, or under the law of which, that award was made 
. . . (a) The subject matter of the difference is not 
capable of settlement by arbitration under the law of 
that country; or (b) The recognition or enforcement of 
the award would be contrary to the public policy of that 
country.28 
The United States Federal Arbitration Act’s (FAA) defenses 
frequently take precedence over Convention defenses when a cause of 
action demands that a United States award not be enforced.29 
Consequently, FAA defenses are important to address for international 
commercial arbitration awards.30 Section 10(a) addresses exceptions to 
enforcing arbitral awards, including the defense of manifest disregard 
when in any of the subsequent cases the United States court may 
vacate the award upon the submission of any arbitration party: 
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, 
or undue means; (2) where there was evident partiality 
or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them; (3) 
where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in 
refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause 
shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and 
material to the controversy; or of any other 
misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been 
prejudiced; or (4) where the arbitrators exceeded their 
powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, 
                                                            
28 See id.; see also BG Group PLC v. Republic of Arg., 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1205 
(2014). 
29 The Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1925); see Cardell Fin. Corp. v. 
Suchodolksi Associates, Inc., 674 F.Supp.2d 549, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
30 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2002). 
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final, and definite award upon the subject matter 
submitted was not made.31 
Here, the defense of manifest disregard falls within the scope of the 
arbitrators being guilty of misconduct under section 10(a)(3) or 
exceeding their powers under 10(a)(4).32 Hence, the exceptions for the 
non-enforcement of an arbitral award may only occur when the 
contracting parties agree to United States law as controlling the 
contract, and the arbitral award violates the exceptions stated above for 
either the New York Convention or the FAA.33 
Section 10(a)(4) has created controversy because courts have 
interpreted the term “exceeded their powers” differently.34 In Hall 
Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., the Supreme Court reviewed 
the defenses described above on whether contracting parties can 
modify the grounds for vacating an arbitral award.35 The Court saw 
any expansion to these defenses “as the camel’s nose: if judges can 
add grounds to vacate (or modify), so can contracting parties.”36 The 
court was addressing a tension between whether the arbitration defense 
could be modified by contracting parties or the courts.37 Consequently, 
the Court held that judges and contracting parties cannot expand the 
FAA defenses because the FAA defenses were exclusive.38 Based on 
“national policy favoring arbitration,” the Court decided to limit the 
“review needed to maintain arbitration’s essential virtue of resolving 
disputes straightway.”39 Thus, a circuit court split developed regarding 
the defense of manifest disregard, directly stemming from the Supreme 
Court’s failure to directly address or clarify the issue.40 
                                                            
31 9 U.S.C. §§ 10(a)(1)-(4); Kolel Beth Yechiel Mechil of Tartikov, Inc. v. YLL 
Irrevocable Tr., 878 F.Supp.2d 459, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); see Cardell Fin. 
Corp., 674 F.Supp.2d at 552 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
32 Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 585 (2008). 
33 9 U.S.C. § 10; accord Cardell Fin. Corp, 674 F.Supp.2d at 552. 
34 Hall Street Associates, 552 U.S. at 577-78. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 585. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 578. 
39 Id. at 588. 
40 See generally id. 
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III. DEFINING MANIFEST DISREGARD AND ITS COMMON LAW 
ORIGINS 
Manifest disregard applies when there is a well-defined contract 
term or law, the term or law was not a matter of dispute, and the 
arbitrator declined to apply the term or law to the arbitrator’s 
decision.41 Moreover, as demonstrated in Mendelka v. Penson 
Financial Services, Tully Construction Co. v. Canam Steel Corp., and 
Admart AG v. Stephen & Mary Birch Foundation, Inc., the defense of 
manifest disregard is only available to arbitral awards under United 
States law or within the United States.42 However, manifest disregard 
is not applied in all states or in all courts.43 For an international arbitral 
award, a few courts will not apply manifest disregard.44 If the contract 
clearly applies United States law, the Convention must also apply to 
the award.45 The attempts to apply public policy with manifest 
disregard have often been futile because United States national policy 
favors high deference to arbitral awards.46 However, there have been 
attempts to apply to manifest disregard within a limited scope of the 
Convention under the FAA defense of the arbitrators exceeding their 
powers.47 Under the Convention, arbitrators’ authority does have 
limits. This is especially true when the arbitrators exceed those 
                                                            
41 Jacada (Eur.), Ltd. v. Int’l Mktg. Strategies, Inc., 401 F.3d 701, 713 (6th Cir. 
2005). 
42 See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (2002) (providing language that courts look to as 
justification for manifest disregard); Mendelka v. Penson Fin. Servs., No. 16-cv-
7393 (PKC), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49536, at *7-8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2017) 
(recognizing manifest disregard); Tully Constr. Co. v. Canam Steel Corp., No. 
13-Civ.-3037 (PGG), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25690, at *47 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 
2015) (recognizing manifest disregard); Admart AG v. Stephen & Mary Birch 
Found., Inc., 457 F.3d 302, 307 (3d Cir. 2006) (recognizing manifest disregard). 
43 Zeiler v. Deitsch, 500 F.3d 157, 166 (2d Cir. 2007); see Yusuf Ahmed Alghanim 
& Sons, W.L.L. v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 126 F.3d 15, 22 (2d Cir. 1997) (arguing 
that the non-enforcement of an arbitral award is only possible under the arbitral 
forum’s law). 
44 Zeiler, 500 F.3d at 166. 
45 But see Westerbeke Corp. v. Daihatsu Motor Co., 304 F.3d 200 (2d Cir. 
2002) (holding that manifest disregard does not apply to award of expectancy 
damages). 
46 M & C Corp. v. Erwin Behr GmbH & Co., 87 F.3d 844, 851 n.2 (6th Cir. 1996); 
see, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 
614, 638 (1985). 
47 Wise v. Wachovia Secs., LLC, 450 F.3d 265, 268 (7th Cir. 2006). 
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powers.48 In DiRussa v. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc., the Second Circuit 
defined § 10(a)(4) as “whether the arbitrators had the power, based on 
the parties’ submissions or the arbitration agreement, to reach a certain 
issue, not whether the arbitrators correctly decided that issue.”49 The 
court held that when an arbitrator did award attorney fees, the 
arbitrator was not in manifest disregard of the law and did not exceed 
the arbitrator’s powers.50 Furthermore under § 10(a)(4), the court will 
not vacate an arbitral award even when the court has determined that 
the arbitrator made a “serious error” so long as the arbitrator was 
acting “even arguably” under the parties’ contract.51 Moreover, after 
Hall Street, manifest disregard of the law became a questionable 
defense.52 
The 1953 Wilko v. Swan case is the common law origin of manifest 
disregard and precedes the Convention.53 Before Wilko, courts referred 
to the manifest disregard concept with a general disfavor of arbitral 
awards.54 In United States v. Farragut, the Court ruled that an award 
may be overruled “for manifest mistake of law” or for “exceeding the 
power conferred.”55 The term “manifest mistake” is an award defense 
similar to Wilko’s subsequent manifest disregard defense because both 
defenses apply in cases where laws were not appropriately applied.56 
However, in Burchell v. Marsh, the Court ruled that arbitration awards 
would only be vacated under very limited situations.57 Furthermore, in 
Karthaus v. Ferrer, the Court found that a “distinct specification” must 
                                                            
48 See Gas Nat. Aprovisionamientos, SDG, S.A. v. Atlantic LNG Co. of Trin. & 
Tobago, No. 08-Civ.-1109(DLC), 2008 WL 4344525, at *4 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 
2008) (commenting that the FAA’s defense of exceeding arbitral power was 
beyond the Convention’s intention). 
49 DiRussa v. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc., 121 F.3d 818, 824 (2d Cir.1997). 
50 Id. at 827-28. 
51 United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987). 
52 See Hall Street Associates, 552 U.S. at 586. 
53 See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953). 
54 See Ann C. Gronlund, Note, The Future of Manifest Disregard as a Valid 
Ground for Vacating Arbitration Awards in Light of the Supreme Court’s 
Decision in Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 96 IOWA L. REV. 1351, 
1356 (2011) (discussing Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 and the courts’ 
application). 
55 United States v. Farragut, 89 U.S. 406, 420 (1874). 
56 Compare id., with Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436-37. Origins of manifest disregard may 
be manifest mistake due to similar definitions. 
57 See Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 344, 349-51 (1854). 
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be used in arbitration agreements and “in the construction of 
awards . . . no intendment shall be indulged, to overturn an award, but 
every reasonable intendment shall be allowed, to uphold it.”58 Finally, 
in Carnochan v. Christie, the Court considered vacating an arbitral 
award when (1) “the arbitrators have not decided the whole matter that 
was submitted to them,” (2) “[arbitrators] have decided and awarded 
what was not submitted,” and (3) “the award is uncertain.”59 
Interestingly, these grounds are similar to those later codified in FAA 
§ 10.60 Thus, although courts now are even more deferential to arbitral 
awards, there is a long, established history of vacating these awards for 
precise and “narrow” conditions.61 
After recognizing the FAA goal of “speedier, more economical and 
more effective enforcement of rights” for arbitration, the Fifth Circuit 
interpreted Hall Street as holding that arbitrators cannot ignore the 
controlling law in a contract, and the arbitrator’s failure to apply the 
controlling law would result in non-enforcement of an award.62 In 
Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, customers made tort 
and securities fraud claims, and claims under the Racketeer Influenced 
and Corruption Organization Act (“RICO”) against a broker.63 The 
Supreme Court ruled that the customers would have to arbitrate the 
security fraud and RICO claims because the Court enforced the 
arbitration agreements for the claims of security fraud and RICO.64 
Thus, McMahon overruled Wilko, and the Court held that Wilko was 
obsolete considering subsequent federal statutes applying to 
commercial transactions for arbitration contracts under the Securities 
Act.65 
                                                            
58 Karthaus v. Ferrer, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 222, 228 (1828). 
59 Carnochan v. Christie, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 446, 460 (1826). 
60 See id.; see also 9 U.S.C.A. § 10(a)(4) (2002). 
61 Circuit split makes the Fifth Circuit interpretation of manifest defense arguable. 
See Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349, 351 (5th Cir. 2009) 
(quoting Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. at 349-51); see also Karthaus v. Ferrer, 26 
U.S. at 228 (arguing that the court will enforce an award unless arbitrator clearly 
violated the contract). 
62 Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 439 (1953). 
63 See generally Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987). 
64 See generally id. 
65 See generally id.; see Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 
U.S. 477 (1989) (holding arbitration agreements enforceable under the 
Securities Act). 
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Furthermore, the Court emphasized the necessity of harmonizing 
the contradiction between Wilko and McMahon.66 For consistency, the 
Court accentuated that McMahon also overruled Wilko, referencing an 
antiquated “judicial mistrust of the arbitral process . . . [that does] not 
hold true today.”67 Moreover, McMahon even stressed that the Court 
has overruled almost all of the “nonarbitrable” grounds in Wilko.68 
Additionally, in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 
Inc., the Court held that arbitrators have the capacity to evaluate the 
intricacies of antitrust cases without judicial supervision.69 Thus, the 
Court now is highly deferential to arbitration compared to the mistrust 
expressed by the Court in Wilko.70 The question remains whether 
manifest disregard is still a valid ground for vacatur when the 
contemporary Supreme Court is strongly opposed to Wilko, the 
common law origin of manifest disregard.71   
IV. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT’S MANIFEST DISREGARD 
INTERPRETATION AND IMPLICATION 
The Court’s highly deferential opinion on arbitrator’s decisions has 
been made clear repeatedly, and the pursuit of arbitral vacatur is only 
allowed for the most “outrageous” transgressions.72 Furthermore, 
courts cannot overrule an arbitrator’s holding if the holding was 
grounded on the arbitrator’s interpretation of the contract.73 Therefore, 
in Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, the Court emphasized that the 
arbitrator’s interpretation should be affirmed, “however good, bad, or 
                                                            
66 McMahon, 482 U.S. at 220-21. 
67 Id. at 221. 
68 Id. at 232. 
69 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 633-34 
(1985). 
70 McMahon, 482 U.S. at 232. 
71 Id. 
72 Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 586 (2008). 
73 Porter Wright, You Choose, You Lose! Supreme Court Rules “Arbitrator’s 
Construction Holds, However Good, Bad, or Ugly” in Upholding Class 
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ugly.”74 Here, the Court emphasized the enforceability of an arbitral 
award because some lower courts have a tendency to second-guess the 
arbitrator’s decision.75 
The current trend of the Court is to uphold arbitrators’ decisions so 
as not to permit a “rerun” for the losing party in court.76 Unfortunately, 
arbitration can sometimes lead to more appellate litigation, which can 
further burden judicial economy and undermine arbitration’s goal of 
expedited results.77 Consequently, the Court is discouraging arbitrating 
parties from seeking a rerun with a trial; however, regrettably, this 
tension continues to plague awards with the losing party sometimes 
seeking a favorable overruling.78 
In Hall Street, the Court made the manifest disregard defense 
questionable as a reason for nonenforcement of an arbitral award.79 
The Court’s dicta created a split in the circuit courts for the common 
law manifest disregard defense.80 The Court’s ambivalence on 
manifest disregard is demonstrated in the Court’s analysis of Wilko: 
Then there is the vagueness of Wilko’s phrasing. Maybe 
the term “manifest disregard” was meant to name a 
new ground for review, but maybe it merely referred to 
the § 10 grounds collectively, rather than adding to 
them . . . . Or, as some courts have thought, “manifest 
disregard” may have been shorthand for § 10(a)(3) or 
§ 10(a)(4), the paragraphs authorizing vacatur when 
the arbitrators were “guilty of misconduct” or 
“exceeded their powers” . . . . We, when speaking as a 
Court, have merely taken the Wilko language as we 
found it, without embellishment . . . and now that its 
meaning is implicated, we see no reason to accord it 
the significance that Hall Street urges.81 
                                                            
74 Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 569 U.S. 564, 573 (2013). 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 See generally Jay E. Grenig & Rocco M. Scanza, “It’s Not Over ‘Til It’s Over”: 
After the Arbitration Award in Sports Arbitration, 70 DISP. RESOL. J. 21, 21-22 
(2015) (positing that post-award procedures under the FAA in Sports Arbitration 
are frequent and consequently undermine the goals of arbitration). 
78 Id. 
79 Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 586 (2008). 
80 Sims & Bales, supra note 3, at 418. 
81 Hall Street, 552 U.S. at 585 (internal citations omitted). 
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The legal field criticized the Court’s dicta here for its use of “maybe,” 
and the resulting confusion regarding manifest disregard’s application 
within the circuits.82 Furthermore, Hall Street created more questions 
than provided answers.83 For example, the Supreme Court in Hall 
Street raises the question of whether Wilko created a “new ground for 
review” for manifest disregard, but then dismisses this issue without 
addressing it.84 Further, the Court presents another question on 
whether manifest disregard was “shorthand” for § 10(a)(3) or 
§ 10(a)(4), but again does not answer the question.85 The Court 
acknowledges the circuit split, and then the Court perpetuates this split 
when failing to answer these questions.86 Consequently, the Court’s 
lack of guidance in these arbitration disputes has intensified the debate 
over the benefits and disadvantages of arbitration in general.87 
In 2010, only a few years later, Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds 
International Corp. added to this confusion when the Court again 
refused to address the manifest disregard defense. The Court did “not 
decide whether manifest disregard survives our decision in Hall Street 
Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc. . . . as an independent ground for 
review as a judicial gloss on the enumerated grounds for set forth at 9 
U.S.C. § 10.”88 The Court had another opportunity to decide whether 
the common law challenge of manifest disregard should survive, and 
yet again did not resolve the issue.89 Thus, the circuits remain split 
when applying manifest disregard.90 
A. Uncertainty in the Circuits 
Immediately following Hall Street in 2008, the First Circuit in 
Ramos-Santiago v. United Parcel Service recognized that manifest 
                                                            
82 See, e.g., Stanley A. Leasure, Arbitration Law in Tension After Hall Street, 39 
U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 75, 78 (2016) (positing that the Court in Hall 
Street exposed the conflict between the “freedom to contract and finality”). 
83 Id. 
84 Hall Street, 552 U.S. at 585. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
87 Amalia D. Kessler, Arbitration and Americanization: The Paternalism of 
Progressive Procedural Reform, 124 YALE L.J. 2940, 2942 (2015). 
88 Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 672 n.3 (2010). 
89 Id. 
90 See Schafer v. Multiband Corp., 551 F. App’x 814, 820 (6th Cir. 2014) 
(applying manifest disregard only for arbitrator’s “disagreement with the law” 
and not “interpretation of the law”). 
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disregard is not a valid ground for non-enforcement of an arbitral 
award.91 Prior to Hall Street, the courts applied a manifest disregard 
test that the arbitration award is: 
(1) unfounded in reason and fact; (2) based on 
reasoning so palpably faulty that no judge, or group of 
judges, could ever have made such a ruling; or (3) 
mistakenly based on a critical assumption that is 
concededly a non-fact.92 
Furthermore, the record must prove that the arbitrator knowingly and 
“expressly” ignored the law.93 However, in the 2015 case Raymond 
James Financial Services, Inc. v. Fenyk, the First Circuit was more 
cautious about the viability of manifest disregard as grounds for 
vacatur.94 Moreover, the court found that it did not need to “resolve 
the uncertainty” of manifest disregard and the resulting circuit split 
after Hall Street.95 Thus, the First Circuit is still undecided on the 
validity of manifest disregard as grounds of vacatur.96 
In Whitehead v. Pullman Group, the Third Circuit refused to 
answer the “open question” of manifest disregard and the resulting 
circuit split after Hall Street.97 The court explained that the case fails 
to establish manifest disregard, even if available, because the 
arbitrator’s decision did not knowingly ignore the law and emphasized 
that the court is “extremely deferential” to arbitral awards.98 The 
arbitrator applied the necessary statute, gave both parties an 
opportunity to submit a brief, and then applied the statute with no legal 
error.99 Furthermore, in Bellantuono v. ICAP Securities USA, LLC, the 
court again refused to resolve the validity of manifest disregard for 
vacatur.100 Prior to Hall Street, the Third Circuit did recognize 
manifest disregard of the law although this common law reason was 
                                                            
91 Ramos-Santiago v. United Parcel Serv., 524 F.3d 120, 124 n.3 (1st Cir. 2008). 
92 Id. at 124 (citing McCarthy v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc., 463 F.3d 87, 91 (1st 
Cir. 2006)). 
93 Id. (quoting Advest, Inc. v. McCarthy, 914 F.2d 6, 9 (1st Cir.1990)). 
94 Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Fenyk, 780 F.3d 59, 64-65 (1st Cir. 2015). 
95 Id. at 65. 
96 Id. 
97 Whitehead v. Pullman Grp., LLC, 811 F.3d 116, 120-21 (3d Cir. 2016). 
98 Id. at 121. 
99 Id. 
100 Bellantuono v. ICAP Sec. USA, LLC, 557 F. App’x 168, 173-74 (3d Cir. 2014). 
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not explicitly stated under the FAA.101 Bellantuono also noted the 
current circuit split regarding the application of manifest disregard.102 
Like the more recent Whitehead case, Bellantuono avoided the 
manifest disregard question because the party failed to provide 
significant evidence to meet the high standard of manifest disregard 
and the court did not have to determine the viability of this common 
law ground for vacatur after Hall Street.103 
In Schafer v. Multiband Corp, the Sixth Circuit refused to settle the 
issue of manifest disregard following Hall Street.104 Like the Third 
Circuit, the Sixth Circuit also found that there was not a manifest 
disregard of the law.105 Schafer did recognize that the arbitrator’s 
decision was “legally unsupportable” and that the court would “reverse 
the decision if it had been made by a district court.”106 However, the 
arbitrator’s decision would still fail to meet the higher standard of 
manifest disregard even if available for vacatur because the arbitrator 
can “disagree with nonbinding precedent without disregarding the 
law.”107 Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit ruled that an arbitrator is not 
“bound by the legal holding” of the Sixth Circuit, but the arbitrator can 
still not “reject the law.”108 Thus, the Sixth Circuit remains undecided 
on the manifest disregard of the law for non-enforcement of an arbitral 
award; however, it would recognize manifest disregard “albeit not in a 
published holding.”109 
Additionally, in the earlier case of Coffee Beanery, Ltd. v. WW, 
L.L.C., the Sixth Circuit commented that after Wilko, all federal 
appellate courts have permitted manifest disregard as grounds for 
                                                            
101 Id. at 173 (citing Tanoma Min. Co., Inc. v. Local Union No. 1269, 896 F.2d 745, 
749 (3d Cir. 1990)). 
102 Id. 
103 Compare Whitehead, 811 F.3d at 120-21 (declining to address the “open 
question” of whether the arbitrators’ actions “amounted to” manifest disregard), 
with Bellantuono, 557 F. App’x at 174 (refusing to address the viability of the 
manifest disregard defense). 
104 Schafer v. Multiband Corp., 551 F. App’x 814, 819 (6th Cir. 2014). 
105 Compare Schafer, 551 F. App’x at 819, with Whitehead, 811 F.3d at 120, and 
Bellantuono, 557 F. App’x at 174 (evidence did not show manifest disregard of 
the law, so courts refused to address viability of manifest disregard as grounds 
for vacatur). 
106 Schafer, 551 F. App’x at 819. 
107 Id. at 820. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. at 819 n.1. 
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vacatur.110 Consequently, this court permitted manifest disregard in 
this 2008 case following Hall Street.111 The arbitrator’s manifest 
disregard of the Franchise Act was evident when the arbitrator ignored 
that the Coffee Beanery owner did not disclose a felony conviction as 
required in the contract.112 Therefore, the court vacated the arbitral 
award because the arbitrator knowingly ignored the controlling law of 
the contract.113 It is important to note that this case took place the same 
year as Hall Street, so the circuit split was not as clearly established.114 
Consequently, the 2014 Schafer case recognizes the circuit split over 
manifest disregard vacating an arbitral award.115 
B. Circuits Permitting Manifest Disregard as Grounds for 
Non-Enforcement of Arbitral Award 
The Second, Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits all allow 
manifest disregard for non-enforcement of an arbitral award following 
Hall Street.116 In the Second Circuit, A&G Coal Corporation v. 
                                                            
110 See Coffee Beanery, LTD. v. WW, L.L.C., 300 F. App’x 415, 419 (6th Cir. 
2008) See also Halim v. Great Gatsby’s Auction Gallery, Inc., 516 F.3d 557, 
563 (7th Cir. 2008); Three S Delaware Inc. v. DataQuick Info. Sys., Inc., 492 
F.3d 520, 527 (4th Cir. 2007); Collins v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 505 F.3d 874, 879 
(9th Cir. 2007); McCarthy v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc., 463 F.3d 87, 91 (1st 
Cir. 2006) (permitting manifest disregard); Dominion Video Satellite, Inc. v. 
Echostar Satellite L.L.C., 430 F.3d 1269, 1275 (10th Cir. 2005); Manion v. 
Nagin, 392 F.3d 294, 298 (8th Cir. 2004); Hoeft v. MVL Grp., Inc., 343 F.3d 57, 
64-65 (2d Cir. 2003); Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 370 (3d Cir. 
2003); Prestige Ford v. Ford Dealer Comput. Servs., Inc., 324 F.3d 391, 395-96 
(5th Cir. 2003); Scott v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 141 F.3d 1007, 1017 (11th Cir. 
1998). 
111 Coffee Beanery, 300 F. App’x at 419. 
112 Id. at 419-20. 
113 Id. at 419-21. 
114 Compare Coffee Beanery, 300 F. App’x at 415, with Hall Street Associates, 
L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 576 (2008). 
115 Schafer v. Multiband Corp., 551 F. App’x 814, 819 n.1 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing 
Grain v. Trinity Health, Mercy Health Servs. Inc., 551 F.3d 374, 380 (6th Cir. 
2008) (“Hall Street’s reference to the ‘exclusive’ statutory grounds for obtaining 
relief casts some doubt on the continuing vitality of that theory.”)). 
116 See Renard v. Ameriprise Fin. Servs., Inc., 778 F.3d 563, 567 (7th Cir. 2015) 
(applying manifest disregard). See also A & G Coal Corp. v. Integrity Coal 
Sales, Inc., 565 F. App’x 41, 42-43 (2d Cir. 2014) (applying manifest disregard); 
Adviser Dealer Servs., Inc. v. Icon Advisers, Inc., 557 F. App’x 714, 717 (10th 
Cir. 2014) (applying manifest disregard); Comedy Club, Inc. v Improv W. 
Associates, 553 F.3d 1277, 1288 (9th Cir. 2007) (applying manifest disregard). 
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Integrity Coal Sales, Inc. still allowed manifest disregard as a possible 
reason for vacatur.117 Furthermore, the Second Circuit referenced 
Schwartz v. Merrill Lynch to justify manifest disregard as grounds for 
non-enforcement of an arbitral award.118 Thus, for non-enforcement of 
an award in the Second Circuit, the arbitrator must have knowingly 
ignored a clearly defined law similar to other circuits that allow the 
challenge of manifest disregard.119 
The Fourth Circuit ruled in Dewan v. Walia that the arbitrator 
manifestly disregarded the law by allowing the enforcement of the 
employee’s release as the company’s accountant while also reviewing 
the employee’s counterclaims for underpayment during 
employment.120 The court looked to the FAA as the controlling law 
because the agreement was between a Canadian citizen and a U.S. 
business.121 However, the court expressed some hesitance to apply 
manifest disregard after Hall Street because manifest disregard is 
considered an “extra-statutory grounds” for vacatur that is not 
expressly stated under the FAA.122 
In Renard v. Ameriprise Financial Services, Inc., the Seventh 
Circuit affirmed the lower court’s holding that the arbitrator did not 
demonstrate manifest disregard of the law.123 Rather than applying 
state law, the Seventh Circuit found the FAA should be the controlling 
law for manifest disregard with the heightened standard of the 
arbitrator knowingly and “deliberately disregard[ing]” the law.124 
Thus, the court found that manifest disregard failed to meet the 
requirements of this higher FAA standard.125 
In Wetzel’s Pretzels, LLC v. Johnson, the Ninth Circuit ruled that 
manifest disregard may still apply to arbitral awards; however, the 
                                                            
117 A & G Coal Corp., 565 F. App’x at 42. 
118 Id. (quoting Schwartz v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 665 F.3d 444, 451 (2d Cir. 
2011)). 
119 Id. (citing Jock v. Sterling Jewelers Inc., 646 F.3d 113, 121 n.1 (2d Cir. 2011)). 
120 Dewan v. Walia, 544 F. App’x 240, 241 (4th Cir. 2014). 
121 Id. at 245 (holding that the FAA controls where there are issues relating to 
“employment contracts and the release evidence and arise out of transactions 
involving foreign commerce”). 
122 Id. at 246 n.5 (quoting Raymond James Fin. Serv., Inc. v. Bishop, 596 F.3d 183, 
194 n.13 (4th Cir. 2010)). 
123 Renard v. Ameriprise Fin. Servs., Inc., 778 F.3d 563, 568 (7th Cir. 2015). 
124 Id. at 567 (internal citation and punctuation omitted). 
125 Id. at 568. 
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plaintiff would need to prove that the arbitrator did not follow the 
controlling law of the contract.126 Further, Comedy Club, Inc. v. 
Improv West Associates commented similarly that the court may apply 
manifest disregard when the arbitrator ignored a clearly defined law.127 
The court found that section § 10(a)(4) of the FAA still allowed 
manifest disregard as a ground for the non-enforcement of an arbitral 
award after Hall Street.128 The court determined that manifest 
disregard is “shorthand” under the FAA § 10(a)(4).129 Specifically, the 
Ninth Circuit held that an arbitral award is not enforceable when 
arbitrators exceed their powers for an award that is “completely 
irrational” or show a “manifest disregard of the law.”130 Thus, the 
Ninth Circuit recognizes manifest disregard as a ground for vacatur.131 
In Adviser Dealer Services, Inc. v. Icon Advisers, Inc., the Tenth 
Circuit upheld manifest disregard as grounds for vacatur.132 Here, a 
new employer attempted to vacate an arbitral award after the arbitrator 
decided in favor of the employer for claims of tortious interference 
with contract.133 The court held that the arbitrators did not exceed their 
powers when permitting liability for the new employer.134 Specifically, 
the court found that the non-enforcement of an arbitral award may be 
grounds for manifest disregard under the FAA and the common law.135 
Following Hall Street, the court ruled that manifest disregard was still 
valid and implied under the FAA.136 Furthermore, there must be 
“exceptional circumstances” when vacating an arbitral award as courts 
                                                            
126 Wetzel’s Pretzels, L.L.C. v. Johnson, 567 F. App’x 493, 494 (9th Cir. 2014) 
(citing Biller v. Toyota Motor Corp., 668 F.3d 655, 665 (9th Cir. 2012)). 
127 Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv W. Associates, 553 F.3d 1277, 1290 (9th Cir. 
2007). 
128 Id.; see Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010). 
129 See Comedy Club, Inc., 553 F.3d at 1290 (citing Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential–
Bache T Servs., 341 F.3d 987, 997 (9th Cir.2003)). 
130 Id. 
131 Id.; see Wetzel’s Pretzels, 567 F. App’x at 494. 
132 Adviser Dealer Servs., Inc. v. Icon Advisers, Inc., 557 F. App’x 714, 717 (10th 
Cir. 2014). 
133 See id. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. (citing Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Okla., 636 
F.3d 562, 567 (10th Cir. 2001)). 
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are highly deferential to arbitral awards.137 Thus, in Adviser Dealer 
Services, Inc. v. Icon Advisers, Inc., the court affirmed the arbitrator’s 
decision and did not find manifest disregard because the arbitrator-
awarded attorneys’ fee was a matter of contract interpretation and not 
an exceptional circumstance.138 
C. Circuits Denying Manifest Disregard as Grounds for Non-
Enforcement of Arbitral Award 
The Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits all rejected manifest 
disregard as a ground of the non-enforcement of an arbitral award after 
Hall Street.139 In Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. v. Bacon, the Fifth 
Circuit denied the possibility of manifest disregard of the law as 
grounds for vacatur because it limits grounds for vacating an arbitral 
award to those expressly written in FAA § 10.140 Although the Fifth 
Circuit recognized manifest disregard of the law, it determined that 
Hall Street overruled that recognition.141 Moreover, the court went 
further back and rejected Wilko as establishing manifest disregard 
under the FAA because the court held that the origins of manifest 
disregard had a “modest debut” in a “vague phrase” in Wilko.142 Thus, 
the court concluded that manifest disregard is not a ground for vacatur 
of arbitral awards.143 
In Medicine Shoppe, International, Inc. v. Turner Investments, 
Inc., the Eighth Circuit limited vacating awards to those grounds only 
expressly stated in the FAA.144 The court focused on the words “must 
grant” referencing Hall Street to rationalize that only those reasons 
enumerated within the FAA were valid for non-enforcement of an 
                                                            
137 Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Okla., 636 F.3d 562, 567 
(10th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
138 Adviser Dealer Servs., 557 F. App’x at 717-18. 
139 See McVay v. Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc., 608 F. App’x 222, 225 (5th Cir. 
2015) (rejecting manifest disregard); Med. Shoppe Int’l, Inc. v. Turner Invs., 
Inc., 614 F.3d 485, 489 (8th Cir. 2010) (rejecting manifest disregard); Frazier v. 
CitiFinancial Corp., 604 F.3d 1313, 1322-24 (11th Cir. 2010) (rejecting manifest 
disregard). 
140 See generally Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349 (5th Cir. 
2009). 
141 Id. at 350. 
142 Id. at 354-55. 
143 Id. at 354 
144 Med. Shoppe Int’l, 614 F.3d at 489. 
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arbitral award.145 Moreover, the court ruled that Hall Street clearly 
ended the common law reason of manifest disregard for vacatur.146 
In Frazier v. CitiFinancial Corp., the Eleventh Circuit ruled that 
manifest disregard was not a ground for the non-enforcement of an 
arbitral award.147 Furthermore, the court commented, “Hall Street 
casts serious doubt on their legitimacy.”148 This court rejected the 
manifest disregard defense with a warning from Hall Street that the 
manifest disregard defense may undermine arbitration.149 In light of 
judicial economy, arbitration should not be a “mere[] prelude to a 
more cumbersome and time-consuming judicial review process.”150 
Hall Street repeatedly emphasized a highly deferential position on 
arbitral awards.151 Therefore, Frazier concluded that manifest 
disregard of the law ended with Hall Street because the FAA statute is 
“exclusive.”152 
Furthermore, Frazier dismissed the plaintiff’s allegation that the 
award was in violation of public policy as to the virtue of 
arbitration.153 The court reviewed manifest disregard as a public policy 
issue and held that Hall Street precluded such non-statutory arguments 
because national policy supports “arbitration with just the limited 
review needed to maintain arbitration’s essential virtue of resolving 
disputes straightaway.”154 To augment this essential virtue, the court 
ruled that the statutory language does not permit an expansion of the 
statutory grounds for the public policy considerations.155 
                                                            
145 Id. (citing Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 587 
(2008)). 
146 Id. 
147 See Frazier v. CitiFinancial Corp., 604 F.3d 1313, 1323-24 (11th Cir. 2010). 
148 Id. at 1322. 
149 See id. 
150 Id. (citing Hall Street, 552 U.S. at 588); cf. Ethyl Corp. v. United Steelworkers 
of America, 768 F.2d 180, 184 (C.A.7 1985). 
151 See Frazier, 604 F.3d at 1522-24. 
152 Id. at 1324 (citing Hall Street, 552 U.S. at 586). 
153 Id. at 1322. 
154 Id. 
155 Id. at 1324. 
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V.  PREDICTIONS ON MANIFEST DISREGARD FOR THE UNITED 
STATES SUPREME COURT 
Although the Supreme Court showed levity by quoting a Clint 
Eastward Western movie when it stated, “arbitrator’s construction 
holds, however good, bad or ugly,” this statement augmented the high 
deference to arbitral awards.156 The Court repeatedly stated that lower 
courts must not overrule an arbitral award even if a court disagreed 
with the arbitrator’s interpretation of the law and must show high 
deference to these awards.157 After Wilko, there is a trend of increased 
deference to arbitral awards as embodied in Hall Street and Stolt-
Nielsen.158 If this trend continues, courts will continue to limit grounds 
for vacatur to those only expressly codified in the FAA and preclude 
any common law grounds like manifest disregard to resolve the current 
circuit split. 
A concern of the Court is judicial economy and the danger of non-
enforcement arbitral awards in light of the losing party often seeking a 
“rerun” of the disputed issue.159 Because arbitration is confidential and 
has lower procedural costs than the traditional judicial process, 
arbitration is desirable for resolving disputes.160 The Supreme Court 
wants to protect these benefits of arbitration.161 Therefore, if the 
common law grounds for vacatur such as manifest disregard 
undermine the Court’s goal of deference to arbitration, then the Court 
is likely to preclude these common law grounds for vacatur of an 
arbitral award. 
On the other hand, there is a growing concern that arbitration is 
undermining the needs of United States employees and consumers.162 
                                                            
156 Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 569 U.S. 564, 573 (2013). 
157 Id. 
158 See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 664 (2010); 
Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 586 (2008). 
159 Oxford Health Plans LLC, 569 U.S. at 573. 
160 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 638 
(1985). 
161 See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, 85-89 (1971) (analyzing the “balance 
of satisfaction” for flawed “procedural justice” against procedural costs); 
Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 240 (2004) 
(comparing “procedural justice” with “accuracy” regarding legal decisions). 
162 Amanda R. James, Because Arbitration Can Be Beneficial, It Should Never 
Have to be Mandatory: Making a Case Against Compelled Arbitration Based 
Upon Pre-Dispute Agreements to Arbitrate in Consumer and Employee 
Adhesion Contracts, 62 LOYOLA L. REV. 531, 534 (2016) (noting employees and 
358 UMass Law Review v. 13 | 336 
If the Court rejects manifest disregard, a party will have fewer 
common law reasons to argue that an arbitral award is unjust.163 There 
may be validity to this argument because the bargaining power of the 
employee is handicapped, especially when an arbitration clause is an 
industry norm that leaves prospective employees with few meaningful 
options.164 However, if the contracting parties have equal bargaining 
power, such as two international companies, then an arbitration 
contract may be highly desirable and the “runaway” arbitration power 
argument fails.165  
Finally, if the Court had to choose between upholding an unfair 
arbitral award or protecting the judicial economy, the Court would 
likely choose to protect the judicial economy. The Court is deferential 
to arbitration awards and aims to discourage the losing arbitral party 
from undermining the efficiency of an arbitration agreement as 
mutually agreed and contracted.166 Further, the Court limits judicial 
review to “maintain arbitration’s essential virtue of resolving disputes 
straightaway.”167 Thus, to resolve the current circuit split, the Court 
will probably limit grounds for vacatur to those explicitly codified in 
the FAA and exclude any common law grounds like manifest 
disregard.168 
VI. INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACT AGREEMENT FOR 
MANIFEST DISREGARD DISPUTES BEING DECIDED BY ARBITRAL 
APPEAL TRIBUNAL 
Manifest disregard should only be grounds for a vacating an 
arbitral award in an arbitral appeals tribunal because (1) there is 
uncertainty in the circuits about the viability of manifest disregard for 
                                                                                                                                            
consumers are usually the “weaker party” forced into unfair mandatory 
arbitration agreements). 
163 See id. 
164 Id. at 558. 
165 Compare id. (discussing how procedural unconscionability may depend in part 
on the precedent of the court hearing the case), with Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. 
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 638 (1985) (highlighting a dispute 
between large businesses with equal bargaining power). 
166 See Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 569 U.S. 564, 573 (2013) (holding 
arbitrator’s decisions final). 
167 Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 588 (2008). 
168 Id. 
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vacating an arbitral award;169 (2) the contracting parties sacrifice 
confidentiality when appealing the arbitral award in the courts;170 (3) 
arbitration has lower procedural costs;171 and (4) when an arbitrator 
knowingly ignores an applicable law in the binding contract, the 
contracting parties should have a remedy.172 
As discussed earlier, because there is uncertainty in the circuits 
about the viability of manifest disregard for vacating an arbitral 
award,173 manifest disregard should only be grounds for a vacating an 
arbitral award in an arbitral appeals tribunal. The Fifth, Eighth, and 
Eleventh Circuits all reject manifest disregard,174 while the Second, 
Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits all allow manifest 
disregard.175 Furthermore, the First, Third, and Sixth Circuits are 
undecided on manifest disregard.176 This circuit split creates a perilous 
situation for arbitrating parties if manifest disregard is raised because 
the outcome will depend on the applicable circuit court.  
                                                            
169 Granof & Aliment, supra note 1, at 59. 
170 Under Seal v. Under Seal, No. 16-CV-7820 (KBF), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
128000, at *19-20 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 2017) (warning that a confidentiality 
provision may become a public record); see also Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. 
Wales LLC, 993 F. Supp. 2d 409, 412-14 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (explaining that the 
confidentiality clause does not overcome public access right); Aioi Nissay Dowa 
Ins. Co. v. Prosight Specialty Mgmt. Co., No. 12-Civ.-3274 (JPO), 2012 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 118233, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2012) (expressing that public 
access to judicial documents supersedes confidentiality provision); but see Kelly 
v. Evolution Mkts., Inc., 626 F. Supp. 2d 364, 377 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (holding 
plaintiff cannot disclose employment contract as expressed in confidentiality 
provision). 
171 Granof & Aliment, supra note 1, at 58. 
172 Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 569 U.S. 564, 573 (2013). 
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174 See generally Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349 (5th Cir. 
2009); Med. Shoppe Int’l, Inc. v. Turner Invs., Inc., 614 F.3d 485, 489 (8th Cir. 
2010); Frazier v. CitiFinancial Corp., 604 F.3d 1313, 1322-24 (11th Cir. 2010). 
175 A & G Coal Corp. v. Integrity Coal Sales, Inc., 565 F. App’x 41, 42-43 (2d Cir. 
2014); Dewan v. Walia, 544 F. App’x 240, 241 (4th Cir. 2014); Renard v. 
Ameriprise Fin. Servs., Inc., 778 F.3d 563, 568 (7th Cir. 2015); Wetzel’s 
Pretzels, L.L.C. v. Johnson, 567 F. App’x 493, 494 (9th Cir. 2014); Adviser 
Dealer Servs., Inc. v. Icon Advisers, Inc., 557 F. App’x 714, 717 (10th Cir. 
2014). 
176 Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Fenyk, 780 F.3d 59, 64-65 (1st Cir. 2015); 
Whitehead v. Pullman Grp., LLC, 811 F.3d 116, 120-21 (3d Cir. 2016); Schafer 
v. Multiband Corp., 551 F. App’x 814, 819 (6th Cir. 2014). 
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To address this uncertainty for arbitration, contracting parties 
could include manifest disregard contract language for review by an 
appeals arbitration tribunal.177 Although the circuit split over current 
manifest disregard is a problem yet to be addressed by the Court,178 
international commercial parties applying United States law are able to 
address the manifest disregard issue by contract. Using this method, 
the contracting parties are effectively taking control of their contract 
by “contracting around” the manifest disregard issue and avoiding 
further uncertainty imposed by the current split. 
However, this contract solution is a deterrence rather a resolution 
to the manifest disregard defense. The losing party can still file a 
motion to vacate the award for the manifest disregard of the law in 
certain circuits.179 First, in such cases, the losing party is placed in a 
difficult position because the arbitral appeal tribunal’s decision will 
likely be highly persuasive for the court. The arbitral award is then 
reviewed by a panel of arbitrators, so the court would be less likely to 
overturn the arbitrators’ decision. Second, because contracting parties 
sacrifice confidentiality when appealing the arbitral award in the 
courts,180 manifest disregard should only be grounds for vacating an 
arbitral award in an arbitral appeals tribunal. Confidentiality is a 
benefit for international commercial businesses with exposure to 
risk.181 Mistakes happen in the globalized world of international 
business with large supply chains.182 Corporate reputations can be 
ruined with one mistake.183 Furthermore, innovative technology 
companies value confidentially, especially if the dispute concerns 
                                                            
177 See, e.g., Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 588 (2008) 
(holding that parties cannot expand judicial review in contract). 
178 See id. at 585 (2008) (commenting “maybe” when reviewing manifest 
disregard). 
179 Bellantuono v. ICAP Sec. USA, LLC, 557 F. App’x 168, 173 (3d Cir. 2014). 
180 Under Seal v. Under Seal, No. 16-CV-7820 (KBF), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
128000, at *19-20 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 2017). 
181 See Aioi Nissay Dowa Ins. Co. v. Prosight Specialty Mgmt. Co., No. 12-Civ.-
3274 (JPO), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118233 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2012). 
182 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 638 
(1985). 
183 See Therese Frare, Jack in the Box’s Worst Nightmare, N. Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 
1993), http://www.nytimes.com/1993/02/06/business/company-news-jack-in-
the-box-s-worst-nightmare.html [https://perma.cc/2FFM-JRT7] (discussing that 
the business reputation was ruined after food poisoning). 
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sensitive internal information about a product.184 However, 
confidentiality limits the damage of these mistakes and allows the 
companies to continue doing business.185 Unfortunately for the 
international commercial business, confidentiality is sacrificed when 
the losing arbitration party appeals an arbitral award in the court 
system.186 
To avoid this loss of confidentiality, the losing party, who believes 
that the arbitrator knowingly ignored an applicable law, could appeal 
the award to an arbitration appeals tribunal.187 This arbitration appeals 
tribunal would keep the parties’ confidentiality, allow the losing party 
to be heard for the alleged arbitrator’s manifest disregard, and allow 
for minimal damage to their reputation or other business privacy 
concerns.188 
Third, because the arbitral appeals tribunal has lower procedural 
costs,189 disputing parties would avoid additional legal costs. The 
Court encourages arbitration for international commercial disputes.190 
Arbitration allows for the parties to agree to the controlling law that 
will govern the commercial contract.191 
                                                            
184 See Breaking Down Apple’s iPhone Fight with the U.S. Government, N.Y. 
TIMES (March 21, 2016), 
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189 Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219–20 (1985). 
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Fourth, when an arbitrator knowingly ignores an applicable law in 
the binding contract, the contracting parties should have a remedy.192 
On its face, manifest disregard is a reasonable ground for vacating an 
arbitral award.193 In an international commercial contract, because the 
business parties would have equal bargaining power and would have 
mutually agreed to a governing law in the contract, the arbitrator 
should apply that applicable law.194 Furthermore, the contracting 
business parties would have had time to consider the applicable 
contract law and the parties would have made a thoughtful decision to 
have that law govern their contract. If the arbitrator knowingly ignored 
the applicable law, then the arbitrator would be harming the 
contracting parties.195 Therefore, the contracting parties would likely 
have a remedy of review for the arbitrator’s manifest disregard of the 
law.196 
In contrast, there is a distrust among legal scholars that arbitration 
will not protect the parties’ substantive rights.197 Even after a ruling by 
an arbitration appeals tribunal, the losing party could still attempt to 
vacate the arbitral award in the United States court system.198 This 
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Review?, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 627, 627 (2006). 
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decision would undermine the efficiency goals of arbitration.199 
However, an arbitration appeals tribunal’s decision could augment the 
arbitral award because the award has already been reviewed.200 In light 
of this, a court may be more deferential to a reviewed arbitral award 
and less likely to vacate the award.201 The arbitration appeals 
tribunal’s decision may also persuade the parties that the arbitral award 
should hold because the award has been appealed, and further appeal 
would be an unwise use of time, money and energy.202 As another 
deterrence, the contracting parties would also be sacrificing the 
confidentiality of their agreement if one party attempts to vacate the 
arbitral award in the courts.203 
The contracting parties should include an arbitration appeals 
provision in their contract, and the parties should expressly address the 
issue of manifest disregard. Consequently, the contracting parties 
could address the issue directly, which would increase the likelihood 
that the matter would not be appealed to the courts. 
VII. CONTRACT LANGUAGE RECOMMENDATION ADDRESSING 
MANIFEST DISREGARD BY ARBITRATION APPELLATE REVIEW 
Because there is limited judicial review of arbitral awards in 
United States courts,204 international commercial parties should 
consider adding contractual language providing for an appellate review 
of an arbitral award by appellate arbitrators. The International Court of 
Arbitration (ICC), the London Court of International Arbitration 
(LCIA), and the American Arbitration Association, International 
Center for Dispute Resolution (ICDR) are the foremost global forums 
for international arbitration.205 
                                                            
199 See, e.g., Grenig & Scanza, supra note 77, at 21-22. 
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right). 
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364 UMass Law Review v. 13 | 336 
The United Stated based Judicial Arbitration and Mediation 
Services, Inc. (JAMS) recommends contract language for appellate 
arbitration.206 The following AAA/ICDR recommendation could apply 
for the appellate standard of review: “Appeals must satisfy one of two 
alternatives to succeed. The arbitrator who issued the award must have 
either: An error that is material and prejudicial; [or] determinations of 
fact that are clearly erroneous. (AAA Optional Appellate Arbitration 
Rule Article A-10.)”207 The JAMS language recommendation that the 
“error of law that is material and prejudicial” may permit a review for 
manifest disregard because the arbitrator knowingly ignored a law that 
was material to the dispute.208 Furthermore, JAMS recommends this 
course of action for reviewing an award under dispute.209 
However, the recommendations above could be improved with 
specific contractual language in the case of the arbitrator’s manifest 
disregard of the law. To address this issue, the contracting parties 
could add the language: 
If the arbitrator manifestly disregards the applicable 
law or knowingly ignores a controlling principle of law 
in the contract, the parties agree to resolve the dispute 
by a panel of three appellate arbitrators. The finding by 
the appeals panel is a final and complete resolution of 
this dispute.210  
This contract language would give notice to the contracting parties and 
to appellate arbitrators. While it is true that the arbitrator’s decision 
may arguably be challenged for exceeding their powers,211 it is also 
true that the three appellate arbitrators can correct an error by the 
initial arbitrator in a timely and efficient manner. Thus, international 
commercial parties who would like to avoid the issue of manifest 
disregard should consider adding the provision to their contracts. 
                                                            
206 See JAMS Optional Arbitration Appeal Procedure, supra note 16. 
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VIII.  CONCLUSION 
Because there is a circuit split over manifest disregard,212 
international commercial parties should consider an appellate review 
of an arbitral award by appellate arbitrators. This contract 
recommendation only applies to an arbitral award that is decided under 
United States law or in the United States. Manifest disregard is 
grounds, under United States common law, for not enforcing an 
arbitration award and applies when the arbitrator knew and understood 
the law, but the arbitrator disregarded this applicable law.213 Appellate 
review of an arbitral award by appellate arbitrators would protect the 
goals of arbitration.214 Furthermore, review by appellate arbitrators 
would avoid the public, more expensive, and prolonged judicial 
process through the United States court system.215  
In the future, the United States Supreme Court likely will expressly 
preclude non-statutory grounds for vacatur such as manifest 
disregard.216 The Court has told the lower courts time and again to 
uphold arbitrators’ decisions.217 The losing party should not have a re-
run of a dispute because the arbitrator decided for the other party.218 
Unfortunately, there is a legal trend for the losing party to use non-
statutory grounds for non-enforcement of an arbitral award and 
undermine the goals of arbitration.219 This trend holds especially true 
for employer contracts.220 However, for disputes arising between 
international commercial parties who share equal bargaining power, 
the Supreme Court of the United States will more likely uphold the 
arbitrator’s decision.221 The Court will probably rule that only the 
statutory grounds expressly written under the FAA will be 
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permitted.222 Thus, the arbitrators’ decisions will hold no matter how 
“good, bad or ugly.”223 
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